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Conversation with r. 1, CCD, 11 July 1949

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Subject: ICEBERG

Ref: Our draft memo re Iceberg Recruitment

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1. E I was interested in the ~~new~~ fact that the ~~desk~~ and ~~the~~ field interpreted the term Iceberg to cover only the commo aspect of the program. Should refer to Stay-behind as a whole.

Add:  
2. Re para 3: ✓ W/T man provides the "only physical contact between persons." By this he meant that the field operator and the base operator come to recognize each other's tricks and habits of sending and establish a personal relationship through these. This serves as a check in the event of a "play-back", - if the field operator is captured and an attempt made by another person to use his set in order to contact the base.

(Note: I shall don't follow the logic of inserting this phrase at this particular point. It originally was a place on the memo.) abm.

3. Two types of equipment and training. Blue - slightly modified from equipment used in World War II. Signal plan fairly simple. Red - more highly classified, to be used where long-range usefulness of network is foreseen.

In either case, E I gave me the impression that Commo expects its systems and ~~magnimixpaks~~ to be exposed in reasonably short order after a start of hostilities. This doesn't necessarily mean a lack of interest in trying to keep these secure.

B. Feels that coordination among the enemy's various agencies is probably no better than among ours or among the Germans. Cited example

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of three sets and signal plans known to have been captured near Marseille during invasion of Southern France. Interrogation of chief of Abwehr's commo section for France revealed that he had never received any knowledge of these plans. (They probably captured by Wehrmacht and never turned over to proper destination - □ □.)

Therefore, the loss of one set of signal plans should not be decisive evidence that the system is effectively blown to the enemy.

4. Commo's chief concern is the danger of play-backs. Here, the discipline of the operator <sup>is</sup> ~~of~~ paramount importance. He must obey orders re burial of equipment, one-time-pads, signal plans, etc., so that these should not be discovered together. The enemy will be unable to play back a radio if he has only a signal plan or a pad. With both, we're sunk.

##### 5. Problems of recruiting.

- a) Anyone with previous radio experience probably known to the enemy, because of their concern for registering all former signal corps personnel, radio hams, etc.
- b) Anyone without previous experience in radio or some related line probably technically undesirable, hard to train.

Have to compromise or "chisel" on two principles. E.G., recruit former radio operator who you have reason to believe <sup>(or hope)</sup> will not be picked up; or pick up a "virgin" and send him up for a refresher course every six months or so in order to keep his hand in.

5. Qualities to look for. Mechanical aptitude, - not only dexterity of touch (for sending purposes), but ability to make minor repairs if something goes wrong with set.

Oral as opposed to visual memory - time wasted by type of operator who has to translate heard sound into seen ~~letter~~ symbol before he knows what it is. For example, a person with visual memory, hears a dot-dash, transfers it into " in his mind, then translates it into the letter A. Too many mental processes involved. Better to find someone who can hear the dot dash and translate it immediately to A.

(This sort of thing has to be left up to the aptitude tests since it's highly unlikely that a case officer could spot this.) Musical ear not necessary, but candidate should have a reasonable sense of rhythm and should not be tone deaf.

6. Re para 7 c: In some ways the chief agent and the operator should know each other, since they will depend on each other and have to work as a team. This better if they have mutual confidence.

Further, even if their introduction is postponed to the last minute, the organization should know what operator candidate is going to work with what network before his training takes place, in order to provide the proper sort of training.

(Blue or Red, special problems, etc.)

7. Chief agent and one-time pads. [REDACTED] 's concept was that the agent rather than the ~~operator~~ operator should be custodian of the one-time pads. Better security. The [REDACTED]

operator may keep in his possession a few sheets in order to be able to contact the base if something happens to the chief agent.

8. Recruiting of women. I mentioned [ ]'s discussion of the use of women by both the Germans and the Soviets. Mr. B. got a little confused at this point and seemed to think that she and I wanted to be trained, or that at least we had in mind some sort of program of dropping [ ] American gals behind the lines. Maxxamxent When this was cleared up, it was pretty obvious that the suggestion hadn't been offered to Mr. B. [ ] before and affected him much the way woman's suffrage [ ] affected my grandfather in 1910.

9. Most important security principle: No one who has ever worked in headquarters should be allowed to go behind the lines.